- Jurisdiction
- Oregon
What is the basis for prosecution, other than court bias towards victim right's advocate provided by court to complainant who merely wants to evade litigation?
Process server charged with criminal trespass for walking up driveway, then crossing "no trespass" sign at recipient's front door, when leaving papers at the door, without entry to curtilage -- as provided in ORCP 9B, which is a legislative enactment. ORS 1.735(1); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tattling Tire & Auto, 325 Ore. 46, 49 n.4, 932 P.2d 1141, 1142 (1997) ("the Oregon Rules of Civil procedure, effectively is a legislative enactment…") Under UTCR 2.020, service of court papers as provided in ORCP 9 is essentially "civil process."
Oregon's criminal trespass law follows common law civil trespass: entry to premises without privilege or authorization. ORS 164.205(3)(a), 164.245; State v. Endicott, 296 Ore. App. 644, 652-53, 439 P.3d 510 (2019). Oregon has adopted Restatement (second) Torts §158. Collier v. Portland, 57 Ore. App. 341, 344, 644 P.2d 1139 (1982) ("Trespass to real property is an intentional entry upon the land of another by one not privileged to enter. Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Ore. 336, 343, 198 P.2d 847 (1948); Restatement (Second) of Torts §158 (1965).") That incorporates §§176-211. This was expressly recognized by the Oregon Supreme Court in, State v. Foster, 347 Ore. 1, 9 n.5, 217 P.3d 168 (2009):
Legislated privilege is addressed at, Restatement (Second) Torts §211, which was adopted by the Oregon Supreme Court in, Hay v. Or. Dep't of Transp., 301 Ore. 129, 135-36, 719 P.2d 860 (1986):
Oregon has affirmatively expanded the absolute litigation privilege to conduct in relation to litigation, with extraordinarily in-depth analysis in, Mantia v. Hanson, 190 Ore. App. 412, 418, 79 P.3d 404 (2003). Most recently elucidated in -- The Puff Factory, LLC v. Port of Cascade Locks, Case No. 3:20-cv-65-SI, 2020 WL 6547637, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208280 (D.OR, 6 Nov. 2020):
Process server charged with criminal trespass for walking up driveway, then crossing "no trespass" sign at recipient's front door, when leaving papers at the door, without entry to curtilage -- as provided in ORCP 9B, which is a legislative enactment. ORS 1.735(1); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tattling Tire & Auto, 325 Ore. 46, 49 n.4, 932 P.2d 1141, 1142 (1997) ("the Oregon Rules of Civil procedure, effectively is a legislative enactment…") Under UTCR 2.020, service of court papers as provided in ORCP 9 is essentially "civil process."
Oregon's criminal trespass law follows common law civil trespass: entry to premises without privilege or authorization. ORS 164.205(3)(a), 164.245; State v. Endicott, 296 Ore. App. 644, 652-53, 439 P.3d 510 (2019). Oregon has adopted Restatement (second) Torts §158. Collier v. Portland, 57 Ore. App. 341, 344, 644 P.2d 1139 (1982) ("Trespass to real property is an intentional entry upon the land of another by one not privileged to enter. Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Ore. 336, 343, 198 P.2d 847 (1948); Restatement (Second) of Torts §158 (1965).") That incorporates §§176-211. This was expressly recognized by the Oregon Supreme Court in, State v. Foster, 347 Ore. 1, 9 n.5, 217 P.3d 168 (2009):
"Where one is privileged to execute civil process on the person… of another, one is also privileged to enter the other's land, by force if necessary, to serve the process." 1 Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr., and Oscar S. Gray, Harper, James and Gray on Torts §1.19, at 75 (2006) (footnote omitted); see Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 208-09 (1965)(discussing requirements of the privilege).
Legislated privilege is addressed at, Restatement (Second) Torts §211, which was adopted by the Oregon Supreme Court in, Hay v. Or. Dep't of Transp., 301 Ore. 129, 135-36, 719 P.2d 860 (1986):
A duty or authority imposed or created by legislative enactment carries with it the privilege to enter land in the possession of another for the purpose of performing or exercising such duty or authority in so far as the entry is reasonably necessary to such performance or exercise, if, but only if, all the requirements of the enactment are fulfilled.
Oregon has affirmatively expanded the absolute litigation privilege to conduct in relation to litigation, with extraordinarily in-depth analysis in, Mantia v. Hanson, 190 Ore. App. 412, 418, 79 P.3d 404 (2003). Most recently elucidated in -- The Puff Factory, LLC v. Port of Cascade Locks, Case No. 3:20-cv-65-SI, 2020 WL 6547637, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208280 (D.OR, 6 Nov. 2020):
As explained by the Oregon Court of Appeals, the litigation privilege "is based upon a public policy of securing to attorneys as officers of the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients. Therefore, the privilege is absolute. It protects the attorney from liability in an action for defamation irrespective of his purpose in publishing the defamatory matter, his belief in its truth, or even his knowledge of its falsity." Mantia v. Hanson, 190 Ore. App. 412, 418, 79 P.3d 404 (2003) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 586 cmt a (1977)). This doctrine has been expanded beyond tort immunity for defamation to include other common law torts and to apply to litigants as well as their lawyers.
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