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The question is how can I complain the next time should the situation be ignored, etc. ??
.CLAIMANT'S THEORY
Was The Claimant Deprived Of A Constitutional Or Federally-Protected Right
Constitutional Rights
First Amendment (protects freedom of religion, free speech, freedom of the press and the right to peaceably assemble)
Examples:
Denial of permit to march, leaflet or speak in a public place--
Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975).
Arrest of speaker at political rally --
Kay v. N.H. Dem. Party, 821 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1987).
Harassment of religious organization --
Nashua Valley Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Town of Ayer, 623 F. Supp. 542 (D. Mass. 1985).
Ejection of citizen from public meeting --
Hansen v. Bennett, 948 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1939 (1992).
Fourth Amendment (protects right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; provides that warrants shall issue only upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation)
Examples:
False arrest --
Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1991).
False imprisonment or illegal detention --
Eberle v. City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1990).
Warrantless search --
Tyree v. Keane, 400 Mass. 1 (1987).
Warrantless arrest --
Fields v. City of S. Houston, 922 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1991).
Failure to timely release pretrial detainee --
Brown v. Coughlin, 704 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Apprehension of suspect by use of deadly force --
Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S.Ct. 1694 (1985).
Apprehension of suspect with excessive force --
Graham v. Connor, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989).
Police pursuit --
Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 2 (1st Cir. 1993).
Sixth Amendment (protects right to an attorney in criminal proceedings)
Example:
Information garnered from surreptitious monitoring of conversations with attorney used to prejudice claimant's defense in criminal trial --
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977);
St. Clair v. Schriber, 916 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1990).
Eighth Amendment (prohibits cruel and unusual punishment)
Examples:
Inmate assaulted by guards --
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
Inmate assaulted by fellow inmates --
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986);
Berry v. City of Muskogee, Okla., 900 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir. 1990).
Inmate denied certain privileges, such as visitation, practice of religious beliefs, access to legal materials, mail, etc. --
Sowell v. Vose, 941 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1991).
Inattention to medical needs of inmate --
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976);
Sires v. Berman, 834 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987).
Suicide of inmate --
Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052 (11th Cir. 1986).
Fourteenth Amendment (a person's rights to life, liberty or property shall not be deprived without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws)
Examples:
Punishment of pretrial detainee --
Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 972 (1991).
Inattention to medical needs of pretrial detainee --
Holmes v. Sheahan, 930 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 423 (1991);
Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2266 (1990).
Suicide of pretrial detainee --
Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1338 (1989);
Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 113 (1992).
Any conduct that "shocks the conscience" or "offends the community's sense of fair play and decency" --
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952);
Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1991).
Illegal interrogation or extraction of involuntary confession--
Rex v. Teeples, 753 F.2d 840 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 967 (1985);
Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992).
Arrests of minorities --
Davis v. Frapolly, 747 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
Selective enforcement of statute or regulation on the basis of race --
Mustfov v. Rice, 663 F. Supp. 1255 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
Deliberate denial of police protection on racial grounds --
Mody v. City of Hoboken, 959 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1992).
Federal Statutory Rights
Violation of a federal statute may also give rise to liability under 42 U.S. §1983 (and other civil rights remedies) if (1) the statute confers substantive rights, and is not merely a congressional declaration of policy; and (2) the statute does not expressly foreclose use of a civil rights remedy. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). A few of the federal statutes which will support a Section 1983 claim are:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §2000e) --
designed to ensure equal employment opportunities without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin
Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. §§1400, et seq.) --
designed to ensure that handicapped children receive education appropriate to their needs
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. §2000bb) --
designed to limit government restrictions on the free exercise of religion
Vocational Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. §§701, et seq.) --
guarantees equal opportunity of vocational rehabilitation and independent living for individuals with handicaps
What Standard Of Care Does The Defendant Owe To The Claimant?
This will vary, depending on the nature of the right allegedly deprived.
First Amendment
Although the deprivation of a First Amendment right need not be intentional, evidence of impermissible motivation (e.g., political) is ordinarily required.
Fourth Amendment
A "seizure" must be intentional in order to give rise to a Fourth Amendment deprivation. The "reasonableness" of that seizure (and, hence, its constitutionality) will be determined by an objective standard whereby the nature and quality of the intrusion is balanced against the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify it.
Eighth Amendment
An inmate's claim based on inadequate medical care or the physical living conditions of his prison will be evaluated under the "deliberate indifference" standard. Inmate suicides are likewise analyzed under this standard. In the event of an uprising, however, prison officials are entitled to use force in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, and will only be held liable for those injuries inflicted with malicious and sadistic intent.
Fourteenth Amendment
A claimant may recover for a denial of procedural due process upon a showing that the defendant intentionally denied that process to which the claimant was constitutionally due.
A claimant may recover for a substantive due process violation upon proof that the defendant acted recklessly or with callous indifference to the claimant's rights. Recovery, however, will only be permitted for a truly horrendous abuse of governmental power. Mere negligence, gross negligence or bad faith will not be sufficient. Finally, deliberate conduct that "shocks the conscience" or "offends the community's sense of fair play and decency" will support a substantive due process claim without proof of the specific liberty or property interest purportedly violated.
In the context of a pretrial detainee denied medical attention, the defendant may be held liable upon a showing of deliberate indifference or proof that the defendant's conduct was grossly negligent or so reckless as to be tantamount to a desire to inflict harm.
In order to recover under the Equal Protection Clause, a claimant must allege and prove "purposeful discrimination."
Did The Defendant Act Under Color Of State Law?
In order to recover under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the challenged conduct must be committed "under color of law." This means that the defendant must have acted in an official, government capacity, clothed with the authority of the state, in order to be held liable. Miga v. City of Holyoke, 398 Mass. 343 (1986). Since cities and towns derive their authority from the state, local government actors are deemed to act "under color of law" whenever they commit acts within their official capacity.
Unlawful Conduct
A police officer acts "under color of law," even if he violates state or local law, provided he acted within the apparent scope of his authority and office.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
Private Action
Acts committed in pursuit of personal interests are not "under color of law."
Cronin v. Town of Amesbury, 895 F. Supp. 375 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 81 F.3d 257 (1st Cir. 1995);
Bonsignore v. City of New York, 683 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1982).
This is true, even if the police officer is on duty at the time he commits such acts.
Delcambre v. Delcambre, 635 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1981).
Off-Duty
Off-duty police officer who invokes the real or apparent authority of the police department, or who engages in activity prescribed generally for police officers, may be acting "under color of law."
United States v. Tarpley, 945 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1960 (1992).
Detail Officers
A police officer on private detail acts "under color of law."
Was The Defendant's Conduct The Cause Of Claimant's Constitutional Or Statutory Deprivation?
In order to recover under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the claimant must prove that the defendant's conduct was not only the cause in fact of his injuries, but also the proximate cause of his constitutional or statutory loss. Cause in fact requires an actual, tangible connection between defendant's conduct and claimant's resultant harm. Proximate cause, which is more elusive, requires proof that claimant's loss was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant
The issue of proximate cause plays a substantial role in claims brought against municipal employers. A municipal employer cannot be held vicariously liable for the civil rights violations of its employees. Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). It can, however, be held directly liable to a claimant whose civil rights were violated as a direct result of a policy, custom or practice adopted or followed by the municipal employer. Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1989). A finding of municipal liability, however, requires proof of an "affirmative link" between the conduct of the municipality and the constitutional or statutory deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
DEFENSES
Immunity
Absolute Immunity
Judges and prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for damages arising from their official acts and decisions. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). They can, however, be sued for injunctive or declaratory relief. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 735 (1980). Absolute immunity likewise protects against malicious acts, provided such acts are performed as part of a judicial or prosecutorial function. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978). Police officers who carry out court mandates or who testify as witnesses in judicial proceedings may also enjoy absolute immunity. Jacobs v. Dujmovic, 752 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Colo. 1990), aff'd, 940 F.2d 1392 (10th Cir. 1991).
Qualified Immunity
A police officer is entitled to raise the defense of qualified immunity if, at the time he acted, (1) he was performing a discretionary function; and (2) he did not violate a clearly-established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person in his position would have known. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Matthews v. Rakie, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 490, 493 (1995). In other words, if a police officer reasonably believed that his actions were lawful in light of clearly established law and based upon all information available to him at the time, then he shall be immune from liability. His reasonable belief, however, will be tested under an objective, rather than a subjective, standard. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984); Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Commrs. of Springfield, 401 Mass. 26, 32 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906 (1988).
Release
A release of liability given in exchange for the dropping of criminal charges may be upheld provided the release was voluntary. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987). The burden of proving the voluntariness of that agreement, however, rests with the defendant. Moreover, refusal to discharge a pretrial detainee from incarceration unless he executes a waiver of his civil rights constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1987).
Statute of Limitations
Federal courts adjudicating civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 must borrow the state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions under the law of the forum state. Thus, in Massachusetts, most Section 1983 actions must be brought within three years from the date the cause of action accrued. Street v. Vose, 936 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1991).
Res Judicata
A Chapter 258 action brought against police officers in state court, after such officers successfully prevailed in federal court under 42 U.S.C. §1983, is barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Hayes v. Town of Orleans, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 682 (1996).
RELIEF
Actual or Compensatory Damages
A victim unlawfully deprived of his or her civil rights is entitled to recover from the police officer responsible for such deprivation for the out-of-pocket expenses he or she sustained as a result of the defendant's conduct. This may include the victim's "specials"--her medical expenses, lost wages or lost earnings, and future loss of income--as well as her "general" damages--pain and suffering, emotional distress, humiliation, injury to reputation, etc. No damages may be awarded based on the abstract "value" or "importance" of the particular constitutional or statutory right infringed. Memphis Community Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). In certain circumstances, however, when a plaintiff seeks compensation for an injury likely to have occurred but difficult to establish, some form of "presumed" damages may be appropriate. Nonetheless, such circumstances remain limited. Domegan v. Ponte, 972 F.2d 401, 417-18 (1st Cir. 1992).
Nominal Damages
When a plaintiff can establish that he was unlawfully deprived of a constitutional or federally-protected right as a result of a police officer's activities, but cannot prove actual harm, then he is entitled to an award of nominal damages ($1) from the jury.
Punitive Damages
Punitive damages may be awarded against a law enforcement official if he or she acted with "evil motive or intent," or with "reckless or callous indifference" to the claimant's civil rights. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983). A municipality, however, is immune from liability for punitive damages. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
Attorney's Fees
Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988, the "prevailing party" in any action brought under Section 1983 may recover "a reasonable attorney's fee" as part of her costs. Moreover, this fee may include expert witness fees. The award of a reasonable attorney's fee is within the sound discretion of the trial court, although that discretion is not without limits. The prevailing party should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee "unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989). A defendant, as the "prevailing party," may only recover attorney's fees "upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even if not brought in subjective bad faith." Christianberg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 4012 (1978).
INVESTIGATION
The defense counsel must take reasonable steps to develop whatever information and documentation may be necessary to identify and defeat the civil rights claim, to support all defenses available to his client, and to minimize or avoid any relief sought by the claimant. This information and documentation will come primarily from three sources: (1) the claimant; (2) the defendant; and (3) third parties.
Claimant
Narrative of event
Prior statements
Employment history and records
job application
insurance information
wage and salary information
fringe benefits
Medical history and records
bills
reports, summaries, correspondence, etc.
Psychiatric history and records
School records
Military history and records
Identities of witnesses
Accident or incident reports
Complaints
Prior claims or litigation
Photographs
Videotapes
Audiotapes
Newspaper clippings
Physical evidence
Past criminal history
Defendant
Narrative of event
Prior statements
Employment data and personnel files
training
discipline
performance reviews and evaluations
references, recommendations, citizen complaints or compliments
physical examinations
psychiatric examinations
citations and awards
Military history and records
Educational background
Physical evidence (vehicles, firearms, clothing, etc.)
Police policies, guidelines and directives
Photographs, maps, diagrams and sketches
Police reports
Witness statements
Investigative file
Court documents re: criminal proceedings
Videotapes of arrest or booking
Audiotapes
radio transmissions
telephone calls
Dispatch log
Internal affairs investigation
Warrants and affidavits submitted in support
Mug shots
Correspondence and materials from District Attorney
Medical records of injured officers
Injury reports or conveyance slips describing condition of claimant
Newspaper clippings
Third Parties
Contact should be made with any third party who may have knowledge or information regarding the incident, including:
District Attorney's Office
Massachusetts State Police Department
Any local Police Department or law enforcement agency that participated in incident
Fire Department
Other witnesses
What a complete idiot do you ever read these cases you spam on the board? Rizzo works for the defense not the plaintiff. DUHI have yet to meet a shyster that "knows" law. LOL, I just helped beat a local tax case, more government propaganda. BS.
File what you need, then file in Federal Court, over 90% are settled out of court, so there is not "official record".
(This is why drones can say "where's the win" lol, they are there, you just have to do it)
Someday you will get it right Scott. Study the cases not those law comic books.Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
2. The judgment of the District Court constitutes an unwarranted federal judicial intrusion into the discretionary authority of petitioners to perform their official functions as prescribed by state and local law, and by validating the type of litigation and granting the type of relief involved here, the lower courts have exceeded their authority under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Pp. 373-381.
(a) The District Court's theory of liability under 1983 was erroneous, being based on a showing of an "unacceptably high" number of incidents of constitutional dimension when in fact there were only 20 in a city of three million inhabitants with 7,500 policemen, and on the untenable conclusion that even without a showing of direct responsibility for the actions of a small percentage of the police force petitioners' failure to act in the face of a statistical pattern was just as enjoinable under 1983 as was the active conduct enjoined in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 , and Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 . Pp. 373-376.......
[C]ontrary to the District Court's flat pronouncement that a federal court's legal power to "supervise the functioning of the police department . . . is firmly established," it is the foregoing cases and principles that must govern consideration of the type of injunctive relief granted here. When it injected itself by injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary affairs of this state agency, the District Court departed from these precepts.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Court [423 U.S. 362, 381] of Appeals which affirmed the decree of the District Court is
Reversed.
What a complete idiot do you ever read these cases you spam on the board? Rizzo works for the defense not the plaintiff. DUH
Someday you will get it right Scott. Study the cases not those law comic books.
Rizzo was 1976 ,and has not been overturned,it's a good idea to e-mail those lawyers you migh learn something. If those attorneys read your post they will be horrified.I'll be sure to email the lawfirm of Pierce, Davis, Fahey & Perritano, LLP and tell t hem that you "know" more than they. These shysters defend police in these actions.
Sorry cyberstalker, my stuff is the real deal. The article is old, from Nov. 99, so sure, one or two cases may be overturned. I guess that's why it's in quotes.
There isn't one lawyer in the US today that knows law! If they knew law, we wouldn't have to go to court. Shysters (supposedly) know procedure, judges know the law.
Rizzo was 1976 ,and has not been overturned,it's a good idea to e-mail those lawyers you migh learn something. If those attorneys read your post they will be horrified.
Do you even read the spam you put up? You cited Rizzo,in your so called Kickass part two,thats what happens when you spam,and cite a case you don't know anything about.Ya, I'm sure cyberstalker. I'm sure comming from you, someone never been in court, never won a case, means alot in this world. (only in your mind).
I don't see the point of your case. The cases I posted are what they use to defend the police, if you like, I can ram so much case law down your throat on how to over come it, if that is what it takes. Not that it would matter, as you have no legal education, and can't interpret law, so your simple opinion means less than nothing. So some piss ant state judge oversteped his bounds. So what. They do it day in and out. That is only ONE case, none of the above, which seems to be more of a warning, have been beat down by the cyberstalker.
As usual, your response is not only unproductive, but negative and completely without merit. No background, no cases, nothing to back up this hocus pocus "one case theory".
I thank you for the case, it will be in my collection of Dumb F--- Judges.
Do you even read the spam you put up? You cited Rizzo,in your so called Kickass part two,thats what happens when you spam,and cite a case you don't know anything about.
If the poster follows your ridiculous advice with the template outlined,the whole thing would be thrown out on a Rule 12(b)(1),(6) motion. Then he would be out the filing fee.
Where did you go to law school? Oh, that's right, you didn't.
(1) A Pro Se's case isn't dismissed so easily.
(2) The hornet leaves out Rule 8(f). I wonder why? And leaves out such cases that tells us they are not dismissed so easily, and leaves out how filing a motion under 12(b) is a sure fire loser:
Spam Removed
(3) I didn't cite Rizo, a law firm that defends police cited it, which is why it was in quotes. Again, that case only shows us what happens when a lower court judge is acting without the authority to do so. It does not reflect on a plaintiff, only the goof ball judge that screwed the pooch.
(1) Show me these special Federal Rule of Civil Procedure for a Pro Se's litigants. On the contrary a Pro Se's case is more likely to be dismissed on a motion because the plaintiff is out his element.
2) I left it out because it deals with the pleading, all that means is the pleading prevails,with the sole concern being whether the complaint reveals enough so that the defendant can respond,and understand why he/she is being sued. Defense still can raise motions to dismiss,under rule 12. Nothing changes that. Defense can also raise a 12(b)(6) motion: failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted it is usually a tough sell however a defense lawyer experienced in Federal court,would be in a much better position against a Pro Se litigant, than a real trial attorney.
Also this post is a carry over you are basically telling a poster to proceed to Federal court under 1983 litigation,against a police dept. This raises several rule 12 motions,so even if the Judge found for plaintiff on a 12(b)(6) it is pretty likely with Rizzo Parrat,and other decisions the defense motion would most likely prevail.
(3) Rizzo is a Supreme court decision not a lower court decision.
"...the right to file a lawsuit pro se is one of the most important rights under the constitution and laws." Elmore v. McCammon, 640 F.Supp. 905,911
...............
Wheres the beef? You are suggesting this poster has cause under 1983 litigation to launch a complaint in Federal court: What is the claim for,what damages have been incurred,do the damages rise at or above $75,000,is the claim barred under sovereign immunity? Nothing in the cases you cited change any of this,or exempt a Pro Se plaintiff from a dismissal no matter how liberally the pleading is construed under 8(f). How does any thing in this post rise to the standard outlined in Monroe (which you also cited) for 1983 litigation in U.S court?uscool:I am saying that local officials discourage redress of grievances and speakers are visiting private groups saying similar things to discourage complaints on good ole boy government. Some have tried to go against good ole government.
What is the claim for,what damages have been incurred,do the damages rise at or above $75,000,is the claim barred under sovereign immunity?
the claim barred under sovereign immunity
Oh spammerdog lets get back to. YOUR WRONG!(1)The amount is $50,000, and only if its based on deversity of citizenship. What an idiot!
(2)The second part, explains just how wrong it (cs) is. When a federal question is involved, the Federal Court has Jurisdiction. Civil rights lawsuits, securities fraud lawsuits, social security matters, anit-trust lawsuits, copyrights and patents-these all involve a Federal Statute and Federal courts have jurisdiction to here them.
(3)Thats really rich! If he knew anything about civil rights, law in general, he's want to modify his post for showing his stupidity.
(4) It would help if the hornet knew what sovereignty actually was.
Anway, here I prove stalker wrong again, as always:
(5)"Common law immunities are inconsistant with civil rights causes of action, State officials are not immune from common law torts" Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 1966)
"Publice officials cannot raise qualified immunity defense to 42 USCA (civil rights) claims" Burrell v. Board of Trustees of Ga. Military College, 970 F.2d 785 (11th Cir. 1992)
(6)Like I said, that waste of time motion to dismiss did my local's no good. They will always file that motion, it is expected.The hornet is completely distorting the law and fact, he's dilusional.
(1) The amount is $75,000 your reading an old law comic book. 28 USC §1332(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs........
Diversity of citizenship is covered as such under 28 USC §1332(a) as:
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign
state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or
subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title,
as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
The code is clear its has to meet the $75,000 threshold,and diversity of citizenship.
TITLE 28--JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
PART IV--JURISDICTION AND VENUE
CHAPTER 85--DISTRICT COURTS; JURISDICTION
Sec. 1331. Federal question
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 930; Pub. L. 85-554, Sec. 1, July 25,
1958, 72 Stat. 415; Pub. L. 94-574, Sec. 2, Oct. 21, 1976, 90 Stat.
2721; Pub. L. 96-486, Sec. 2(a), Dec. 1, 1980, 94 Stat. 2369.)
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Sec. 41(1) (Mar. 3, 1911, ch.
231, Sec. 24, par. 1, 36 Stat. 1091; May 14, 1934, ch. 283, Sec. 1, 48
Stat. 775; Aug. 21, 1937, ch. 726, Sec. 1, 50 Stat. 738; Apr. 20, 1940,
ch. 117, 54 Stat. 143).
Jurisdiction of federal questions arising under other sections of
this chapter is not dependent upon the amount in controversy. (See
annotations under former section 41 of title 28, U.S.C.A., and 35
C.J.S., p. 833 et seq., Secs. 30-43. See, also, reviser's note under
section 1332 of this title.)
Words ``wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs,'' were added to conform to
rulings of the Supreme Court. See construction of provision relating to
jurisdictional amount requirement in cases involving a Federal question
in United States v. Sayward, 16 S.Ct. 371, 160 U.S. 493, 40 L.Ed. 508;
Fishback v. Western Union Tel. Co., 16 S.Ct. 506, 161 U.S. 96, 40 L.Ed.
630; and Halt v. Indiana Manufacturing Co., 1900, 20 S.Ct. 272, 176 U.S.
68, 44 L.Ed. 374.
"local officials discourage redress of grievances and speakers are visiting private groups saying similar things to discourage complaints on good ole boy government".
Sec. 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken
in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief
was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered
to be a statute of the District of Columbia.