- Jurisdiction
- Kentucky
Human action and inaction are, without question, deemed subject to being determined and originated by a given language known as "law"; while, since 1939, existential ontologist J.P. Sartre (1901-1980), realized and demonstrated that given states of affairs are not, cannot, possibly be determinative/originative of human action, or, inaction.
For example, the magistrate sentencing a person to death thinks he is "bound and determined by law" to do so; while all the while, the given language of law, whereby the magistrate deems himself to be acting is not, cannot, in fact, be determinative of the magistrate's conduct, for:
J.P. Sartre's: "No factual state whatever it may be (the political and economic structure of society, the psychological "state," etc.) is capable by itself of motivating any act whatsoever. For an act is a projection of the for-itself toward what is not, and what is can in no way determine by itself what is not." And, further: "But if human reality is action, this means evidently that its determination to action is itself action. If we reject this principle, and if we admit that human reality can be determined to action by a prior state of the world or itself, this amounts to putting a given at the beginning of the series. Then these acts disappear as acts in order to give place to a series of movements...The existence of the act implies its autonomy...Furthermore, if the act is not pure motion, it must be defined by an intention. No matter how this intention is considered, it can be only a surpassing of the given toward a result to be attained. This given, in fact, since it is pure presence, can not get out of itself. Precisely because it is, it is fully and solely what it is. Therefore it can not provide the reason for a phenomenon which derives all its meaning from a result to be attained; that is, from a non-existent… This intention, which is the fundamental structure of human reality, can in no case be explained by a given, not even if it is presented as an emanation from a given."
"Law" whereby the magistrate purports to originate his act of capital punishment, is an ontologically illegitimate/dishonest/dishonorable, and, defeasible theoretical construct.
For example, the magistrate sentencing a person to death thinks he is "bound and determined by law" to do so; while all the while, the given language of law, whereby the magistrate deems himself to be acting is not, cannot, in fact, be determinative of the magistrate's conduct, for:
J.P. Sartre's: "No factual state whatever it may be (the political and economic structure of society, the psychological "state," etc.) is capable by itself of motivating any act whatsoever. For an act is a projection of the for-itself toward what is not, and what is can in no way determine by itself what is not." And, further: "But if human reality is action, this means evidently that its determination to action is itself action. If we reject this principle, and if we admit that human reality can be determined to action by a prior state of the world or itself, this amounts to putting a given at the beginning of the series. Then these acts disappear as acts in order to give place to a series of movements...The existence of the act implies its autonomy...Furthermore, if the act is not pure motion, it must be defined by an intention. No matter how this intention is considered, it can be only a surpassing of the given toward a result to be attained. This given, in fact, since it is pure presence, can not get out of itself. Precisely because it is, it is fully and solely what it is. Therefore it can not provide the reason for a phenomenon which derives all its meaning from a result to be attained; that is, from a non-existent… This intention, which is the fundamental structure of human reality, can in no case be explained by a given, not even if it is presented as an emanation from a given."
"Law" whereby the magistrate purports to originate his act of capital punishment, is an ontologically illegitimate/dishonest/dishonorable, and, defeasible theoretical construct.
