frustration with judges assistant

[richv]

Jurisdiction

Florida

I was served with a non-binding arbitration motion for a dangerous instrumentality doctrine case. I showed up at the court only to find out the opposing attorney cancelled it with the court without informing me. I am defending pro-se. I responded with a motion for dismissal, as well a motion for recovery of lost wages due to the cancellation without notice. I attempted to set up a date for a hearing with the opposing attorney for both motions who stalled and made it impossible to set up. I called the JA who advised me to file a motion for a status hearing to set up a date, which I did. In the meantime, the attorney finally called me back to set up a time, which I agreed to and set up on the judges web site. The website gave me the option of a 15, 30, or 45 minute hearing. I chose 45 because it was my first time and I thought I would need the max time for two motions. The JA said the judge would not allow it and insisted I choose the 30 minute option and said that the judge would refuse a 45 minute option. I was unhappy with that, but chose the 30 minute option to satisfy her. It was nullified anyway, as the JA informed me it was because of the status request I filed, and the notice of date was in the mail. That was fine with me and I received the status hearing order the next day for Aug 12. I called the JA to ask exactly what would happen at the status hearing, and she replied that it would cover the motion to dismiss and the status. That made no sense to me, as I thought it had to be one or the other. She then repeated motion to dismiss and status. No matter what I asked, she repeated that phrase. She even left out the motion to recover lost wages without an explanation. So I am left without any idea what to prepare for and what and who to subpoena. The JA seems intent on foiling my case for what reason I do not know. Would appreciate any advice on options I may have.

 

[adjusterjack]

The JA seems intent on foiling my case for what reason I do not know.

It's not intentional and has nothing to do with you personally.

Here's the reason:

Court personnel CANNOT and MUST NOT give you "legal advice."

So I am left without any idea what to prepare for and what and who to subpoena.

When you represent yourself in court you are expected to, and required to, know what you are doing.

If you don't (and you apparently don't) then you need to hire a lawyer or you will get it all wrong and lose whatever it is you are trying to accomplish.

 

[army judge]

I was served with a non-binding arbitration motion for a dangerous instrumentality doctrine case. I showed up at the court only to find out the opposing attorney cancelled it with the court without informing me. I am defending pro-se. I responded with a motion for dismissal, as well a motion for recovery of lost wages due to the cancellation without notice

If that's the basis for your motion to dismiss, you won't prevail.

If you can't argue the merits of your case, you don't have a case.

What the heck does that mean?

It means its time to negotiate and settle before you get clobbered and gobsmacked.

 

[rvidair]

If that's the basis for your motion to dismiss, you won't prevail.

If you can't argue the merits of your case, you don't have a case.

What the heck does that mean?

It means its time to negotiate and settle before you get clobbered and gobsmacked.

That's not the basis of my motion. This is. But still need solution to my problem.

DEFENDANT RICHARD M. VIDAIR AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS COMES NOW defendant Richard M. Vidair ("Richard") who moves this court to enter an order dismissing him as a defendant in this case based on the following grounds: Richard invokes the "naked legal title" exception, also known as the beneficial ownership exception, to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, Christensen v. Bowen, 140 So.3d 498, at 501 (Fla. 2014): "A narrow exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine has been recognized in cases where the titleholder lacks the beneficial ownership of a vehicle. See Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So.2d 60, 64 (Fla. 2000). (" In Metzel v. Robinson, 102 So.2d 385, 385-86 (Fla. 1958), the Court made it clear that, absent a conditional sales agreement, the circumstances where an entity or individual who possessed legal title would not be vicariously liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine were extremely limited."). Under this "beneficial ownership" or " bare legal title" exception, a titleholder may avoid vicarious liability if the titleholder demonstrates that he or she does not have the authority to exert any dominion or control over the vehicle and therefore is not a beneficial owner of the vehicle. Id. at 63-65. In such circumstances, this Court has held that the titleholder holds only "naked legal title" in the vehicle. See Palmer v. R. S. Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So.2d 635, 637 (Fla. 1955)." (Emphasis added) The vehicle in question was jointly bought on or about March 3, 2010, with both Richard's and Cheryl's names on the title. On or about July 1, 2011, Richard had separated from Cheryl and rented an apartment. On August 20, 2011, Cheryl was placed on her own insurance policy insuring the 2005 Camry (Exhibit 1). On April 27, 2012, the Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage was entered and on May 1, 2012, Richard remarried. The Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage gave Cheryl full custody, responsibility, and benefit of the vehicle in question (see Richard M. Vidair Defenses, Attachment A, page 4, Assets: Description of Items(s) Wife Shall Receive, under Automobiles, and page 7, Liabilities: Description of Debt(s) to be Paid by Wife, under Auto Loan, 2005 Toyota Camry, incorporated herein by reference). As per page 7 of the Final Judgment, at the top, Cheryl was to "pay as her own" the debt on the 2005 Camry and was "not at any time ask Husband to pay" that debt, which he did not. She was to make all the payments left on the loan, she was to maintain the vehicle, she was to have insurance on it, and she need not ask anyone for permission to use it as she saw fit. Thus, Richard conferred all beneficial rights to Cheryl and was not in a position "to exert any dominion and control" over the vehicle in question. Unlike Robert Christensen and Mary Gregory Taylor-Christensen whose names on the certificate of title were separated by the word "or", giving each of them the "absolute" right unilaterally "to encumber the car or sell it without the joinder of Ms. Taylor-Christensen", Christensen, at 499, 503, Richard M. Vidair and Cheryl Churan Vidair names were not separated by the word "or". Their names were separated by the word "and" (Exhibit 2). Thus, Richard did not have the absolute right to encumber or sell the vehicle without the joinder of Cheryl. The present case is distinguished from Marshall v. Gawel, 696 So.2d 937, 938-39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), where the mother put her name on the title as a coguarantor solely for the purpose of helping her daughter to obtain the necessary financing to purchase the vehicle. However, when the husband, whose name was not on the title, negligently drove the vehicle and injured someone, the Second District Court held the mother was vicariously liable because "(1) she did not divest herself of title, (2) she had insurance on the vehicle, and (3) she resided together with 2 her daughter", Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So.2d 60, 65 (Fla. 2000). These three elements are not present here: (1) Richard totally divested himself of his entire interest in the vehicle per the Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage dated March 19, 2012, over two years before June 2, 2014, the date of the accident that precipitated this cause of action; Cheryl was to "pay as her own" the debt on the 2005 Camry and was "not at any time ask Husband to pay" that debt, (2) he removed himself from the insurance policy for the vehicle in question on August 20, 2011, almost three years before June 2, 2014, the date of the accident that precipitated this cause of action, and (3) he did not reside with Cheryl from July 1, 2011, almost three years before June 2, 2014, the date of the accident that precipitated this cause of action. In Plattenburg v. Dykes, 798 So.2d 915, 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) the Court "appl[ied] beneficial ownership exception where defendant had presented sufficient evidence that he gifted his entire interest in the vehicle, and the donee simply had not yet completed the paperwork to transfer the title at the time of the accident)", Christensen, at 505. Richard's Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage should be sufficient evidence that he divested himself of the entire interest in the vehicle since March 19, 2012, although Cheryl simply had not completed paying off the loan at the time of the accident. It was only after their son paid off the loan for Cheryl on or about February 12, 2015, that Richard's name was finally removed from the title. WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Richard M. Vidair should not be held vicariously liable for the damages Cheryl Churan Vidair's negligent use of the vehicle inflicted upon plaintiff, and therefore, he moves this court to grant his motion to dismiss him as a defendant with prejudice, and to enter an order adjudicating the same. ____________________________ Richard M. Vidair

 

[adjusterjack]

Your lengthy and unreadable question has been discussed on another website.

 

[army judge]

I stand by my original comments EVEN MORE after reading a couple sentences of what you're calling a motion. Sheesh, sigh, oh my!

 

[Michael Wechsler]

So we are talking about Florida's dangerous instrumentality statute. The stringent nature of that law has been discussed here several times. However, you're not going to be able to simply dismiss the case entirely even if you believe you are correct on the law and the facts. As both my colleagues have explained, it's not going to happen. A dismissal may be granted only when there is some indisputable fact that would preclude the plaintiff from being successful or from the court exerting jurisdiction over you. Each of you has an opinion regarding the facts and the law, hence the need to adjudicate the matter.